\n<\/p>\n
At times of war and social unrest, apps like Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger give people a way to connect within and across borders to share information and make their voices heard. In a number of regions around the world, we\u2019ve seen attempts by governments to silence citizens, control the flow of information, and manipulate public debate. Nowhere has this been more apparent over the last year than in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and during the mass protests in Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n We go to great lengths to protect people\u2019s ability to use our apps when they\u2019re needed the most. Of course, there are times when we have to take action against content that doesn\u2019t otherwise violate our policies in order to comply with local laws. But our starting point is always to defend people\u2019s ability to make their voices heard and to resist attempts to clamp down on the use of our services \u2014 especially during times of war and social unrest. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n As part of our commitment to transparency, we also publish quarterly reports that give insights into our work in this area, including the adversarial threats we\u2019ve identified and taken action against, and our enforcement of Meta\u2019s policies. Alongside today\u2019s publication of these and other transparency reports covering Q4 2022, we\u2019re also providing updates on our actions relating to the Russia-Ukraine war and the protests in Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n It is nearly a year since Russia\u2019s full scale invasion of Ukraine. Within days, Russia attempted to block or restrict access to Facebook and Instagram as part of a wider attempt to cut Russian citizens off from the open internet, silence people and independent media, and manipulate public opinion. Since the invasion began,<\/span> we\u2019ve provided updates on our response<\/span><\/a>, including the measures we\u2019ve taken to help keep Ukrainians and Russians safe, our approach to misinformation, state-controlled media and ensuring reliable access to trusted information.<\/span><\/p>\n Throughout the war, our teams have been on high alert to identify emerging threats and respond as quickly as we can. As it has progressed, we have observed changes in both overt and covert Russian influence operations on our platform and on the internet more broadly.<\/span><\/p>\n After we applied new and stronger enforcements to Russian state-controlled media, including demoting <\/span>their posts and providing labels to users so they know the source of information, the most recent <\/span>research<\/span><\/a> has found that there was a substantial drop in the activity of these Pages around the world, as well as a substantial drop in people\u2019s engagements with the content they posted.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In total, we labeled more than 450 Pages and Instagram accounts. In response, we saw state-controlled <\/span>media shifting to other platforms and using new domains to try to escape the additional transparency on (and demotions against) links to their websites. We observed this behavior around the world, not only in places where Russian state media faced government restrictions.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n While overt activity by Russian state-controlled media on our platforms has decreased, attempts at covert activity have increased sharply. Russian covert networks have historically<\/span> targeted Ukraine<\/span><\/a> more than any other country. Last year, we took down two Russian covert influence campaigns that focused on the war. Rather than trying to build up convincing fake personas, these campaigns resembled \u201csmash-and-grab\u201d operations that used thousands of fake accounts across social media \u2014 not Meta platforms alone \u2014 in an attempt to overwhelm the conversation with their content. In both cases, our automated systems detected and disabled the majority of these accounts soon after they were created.<\/span><\/p>\n Since taking these two networks down we\u2019ve seen thousands of recidivist attempts to create fake accounts. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organization domains.<\/span><\/p>\n The work of hundreds of humanitarian organizations and volunteer groups gets impacted when information is cut off or limited. Through our Data for Good program, established in 2017, Meta has been part of an unprecedented collaboration between technology companies, the public sector, universities, nonprofits and others to aid disaster relief, support economic recovery, and inform policy and decision making. Data for Good datasets informed the work of humanitarian partners, including Direct Relief, who provided 650 tons of medical aid and $14.7 million in direct financial assistance to support Ukrainian refugees. They also inform the work of large UN agencies like International Organization for Migration, United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees and others, as they support medical relief, housing and resettlement efforts.<\/span><\/p>\n Displacement estimates from <\/span>Data for Good<\/span><\/a> have helped fill gaps in official statistics on where displaced populations ultimately resettle after leaving Ukraine. For example, many people leave Ukraine and immediately enter Poland but then may move on to Germany or the Czech Republic, which official statistics may not report. Information from Data for Good has uncovered demographic insights on these <\/span>populations, including age and gender breakdowns, which have helped inform the type of medical services needed, as well as employment support. These insights also informed the World Bank\u2019s support to governments. They pivoted some of their resource allocations around food and housing in favor of registration and employment services as a result.<\/span><\/p>\n We\u2019ve also seen a huge outpouring of generosity and solidarity for the people of Ukraine from Facebook and Instagram users all over the world. So far, people have raised nearly $70 million on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine on Facebook and Instagram.<\/span><\/p>\n The widespread protests that began in the wake of the awful killing of Mahsa Amini led to the Iranian authorities clamping down aggressively on speech and freedom of assembly, as well as limiting the use of the internet and apps like Instagram which are widely used by Iranians. We\u2019ve followed events closely and taken a number of steps to try and keep people connected and safe.<\/span><\/p>\n Despite attempts to block Instagram, we\u2019re seeing tens of millions of people still finding ways to access it via VPNs and other means, including with a more stable connection through Instagram Lite, which we launched in Iran last year to help people access Instagram when bandwidth is reduced. In January, we also <\/span>introduced<\/span> a blocking circumvention tool into WhatsApp<\/a> that allows people to access WhatsApp through proxy servers set up by volunteers around the world.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Instagram has been widely used by Iranians to shed light on the protests and the brutal response of the regime. Since Mahsa Amini\u2019s death, hashtags related to the protests in Iran have been used on Instagram more than 160 million times. #Mahsaamini was the fifth top hashtag globally during the first three months of protests, demonstrating the power of social media to help create awareness in these critical moments. Protestors have shared their Instagram footage of the protests with international media outlets, many of whom can\u2019t report from Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n When the protests began we moved quickly to set up a dedicated team focusing on addressing any issues stemming from them. This team is made up of Farsi speakers, as well as experts on our policies, products, operations, and human rights, who are working round the clock to make sure we apply our policies correctly and address any mistakes as quickly as possible.<\/span><\/p>\n We responded to over-enforcement at the start of protests when we saw accounts suddenly posting <\/span>unusually high volume of videos and triggering our spam detection to temporarily restrict them from posting. We can\u2019t turn off our spam detection that protects our global community, so our teams have been working on other ways to prevent over-enforcement.<\/span><\/p>\n Social media accounts of activists and journalists are often targeted during protests. We\u2019ve <\/span>designed policies to give these groups more protections from threats of violence<\/span>, including <\/span>removing content that \u201couts\u201d people as activists in situations that could put them in danger. A<\/span>nd when we become aware of human rights defenders who have been arrested or detained as a result of their work, we take steps to thwart unauthorized access to their accounts<\/span>. To help people condemn and raise awareness of human rights abuses, we allow graphic content \u2014 often with a warning label \u2014 while still removing particularly violent content.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nRussia\/Ukraine<\/h2>\n
State-controlled media:<\/span><\/h4>\n
Covert influence campaigns:<\/span><\/h4>\n
Humanitarian support:<\/span><\/h4>\n
Iran<\/h2>\n
Helping people connect:<\/span><\/h4>\n
Helping protestors shine a light on events on the ground:<\/span><\/h4>\n
Quarterly Transparency Report<\/h2>\n