{"id":23368,"date":"2026-08-19T02:01:45","date_gmt":"2026-08-19T02:01:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/chinas-private-rocket-maker-just-landed-a-booster-like-spacexs-falcon-9-heres-how-they-did-it\/"},"modified":"2026-08-19T02:01:45","modified_gmt":"2026-08-19T02:01:45","slug":"chinas-private-rocket-maker-just-landed-a-booster-like-spacexs-falcon-9-heres-how-they-did-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/chinas-private-rocket-maker-just-landed-a-booster-like-spacexs-falcon-9-heres-how-they-did-it\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s Private Rocket Maker Just Landed a Booster Like SpaceX\u2019s Falcon-9--Here's How They Did It"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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August 19 morning marks a historic peak for China\u2019s commercial space industry.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s private rocket company\u2019s Zhuque-3 (ZQ-3), often dubbed the \u201cChina\u2019s Falcon 9,\u201d successfully recovered its first stage booster on its second attempt. It might not be as explosive as a first-try success, and it missed out on the glory of being China\u2019s very first booster recovery, but it\u2019s still a seriously impressive achievement. It is land-based, and in a Falcon-9 style, standing on the pad with legs.<\/p>\n

Just like the Falcon 9, it uses landing legs for recovery (which visually looks like the launch sequence played in reverse). That said, the Falcon 9 actually had way more early failures before getting it right.<\/p>\n

The video clips shows that two minutes and some seconds after the launch, the first-stage booster successfully separated from the second-stage rocket carrying a satellite. Less than ten minutes after launch, the booster, having undergone two retro-propulsion decelerations, slowly landed at a recovery site in Minqin County, Gansu Province, about 390 kilometers away from the launch site.<\/p>\n

The size of this rocket are comparable to those of SpaceX\u2019s current workhorse, the Falcon 9, and its overall technological approach is, in a sense, similar to that of Starship, utilizing a stainless steel rocket body and liquid oxygen-methane engines, which could enable it to achieve even lower launch costs than the Falcon 9.<\/p>\n

The Zhuque-3 employs a landing-leg recovery method that slightly sacrifices payload capacity, allowing the rockets to be refurbished and relaunched in a shorter time frame, as engineers only need to maintain the rocket itself without having to repair ground recovery equipment.<\/p>\n

Aug. 19\u2019s success came after a recovery failure last year.<\/p>\n

Now, Commercial spaceflight is currently one of the hottest technology sectors. At present, China has more than 20 rocket companies and over 80 rocket models.<\/p>\n

When LandSpace (<\/span>\u84dd\u7bad\u822a\u5929<\/a>) was founded in June 2015, SpaceX\u2019s Falcon 9 had not yet successfully achieved reusable recovery, and China\u2019s aerospace industry had just opened up to private capital. As one investor put it, the entire industry had \u201cnothing but opportunities.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Today, LandSpace has over 1,200 employees. <\/span>The Shanghai Stock Exchange accepted the IPO application of LandSpace Technology on <\/span>December 31, 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n

LandSpace\u2019s rise can be attributed to its early and steadfast investment, as well as its highly self-reliant development model. LandSpace founder Zhang Changwu recognized early on that key subsystems of a rocket \u201ccannot be bought off the shelf.\u201d <\/p>\n

LandSpace began developing its own engines in 2017 and was also one of the first companies in the industry to build its own test stands, launch sites, and rocket factories. This has allowed LandSpace to master most of its critical technologies and iterate rapidly in-house, without relying on external supply chains.<\/p>\n

The well-known Chinese blog <\/span>LatePost<\/strong><\/em> (\u665a\u70b9) <\/strong>conducted an exclusive <\/span>interview <\/a>with Dong Kai (\u8463\u9534), deputy chief designer of the Zhuque-3. <\/span><\/p>\n

Dong graduated from Harbin Institute of Technology with a major in aircraft design. He originally thought he would enter the military-industrial system and become one of those who \u201cwork in obscurity.\u201d<\/p>\n

In 2009, he joined the General Design Department of the Rocket Research Institute at China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC, \u4e2d\u56fd\u822a\u5929\u79d1\u6280\u96c6\u56e2) as an engineer. During that period, he received comprehensive engineering training and also participated in the development of the Long March 5, then China\u2019s largest-thrust rocket. <\/p>\n

In 2021, he joined LandSpace and was involved in the entire design and development process of the Zhuque-3.<\/p>\n

In Dong\u2019s account, there were no dramatic twists or sci-fi tales of overtaking competitors on the Zhuque-3 project\u2014they simply followed the plan and got the job done.<\/p>\n

Below is the transcript of the exclusive interview.<\/p>\n

**LatePost:** After the previous recovery failure, what improvements did you make before this launch?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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First, we sacrificed some payload weight to reinforce the thermal protection structure. Second, we added gas cylinders inside the tail compartment to purge the air and lower methane concentration before ignition.<\/p>\n

Last time, the failure occurred during the landing ignition phase. According to the plan, the center engine would ignite first, followed by up to four others depending on conditions to slow the descent, and finally the engines would be throttled down from five to one as the landing legs deployed.<\/p>\n

Last time, the anomaly happened in the tail compartment right after the center engine ignited but before the other four fired.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** How much time elapsed between the first and second launches, and what did you do in between?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

The launch was on December 3. By the next day, we had almost all the telemetry and optical data. We didn\u2019t have much time to celebrate or dwell on the disappointment. By December 5, we had already begun the technical fault review for the maiden flight.<\/p>\n

The aerospace industry follows a rigorous methodology \u2013 what we call \u201cpresumption of guilt\u201d combined with \u201cno conclusion from a single piece of evidence.\u201d For example, if an explosion occurs in the tail compartment, there must be an open flame, combustion, and propellant involved. Okay, where did the propellant come from? Where did it leak? Following this chain of reasoning, you break it down into a set of root-level events.<\/p>\n

Every risk that is ruled out must be supported by objective evidence. You can\u2019t dismiss a possibility based on subjective judgment. The process is like criminal investigation \u2013 eliminate all impossibilities, and whatever remains, no matter how implausible, must be the truth. There\u2019s only one truth \u2013 just like in *Detective Conan*.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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**LatePost:** How long did that take?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

About two to three months. For us, a rocket is a significant investment. If we let the real culprit go, that tuition fee would have been wasted.<\/p>\n

Once we identified the fault, we moved to improvements. The engineering side is relatively straightforward \u2013 the rest is about the cost in time and materials to fix it. In the end, these are all solvable engineering problems. We\u2019re not the type to invent hardships for ourselves \u2013 we don\u2019t show off. We choose the most achievable path.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** A key logic in commercial space is to collect data through successive tests and improve. Did the data collection from the maiden flight meet expectations?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Yes, it did. The key is to see whether the actual flight data matches the expectations from our ground simulations and analyses. Sometimes a successful flight could just mean the design margin was large enough to absorb errors, not that our predictions were accurate.<\/p>\n

We did see some data that deviated from expectations. When we spot deviations, we adjust the ground models \u2013 subtracting where necessary, adding where needed. For instance, we changed the recovery ignition from five engines to three based on the data we gathered.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s a saying in aerospace: \u201c<\/span>If not necessary, do not add entities<\/em>.\u201d (Note: <\/span>Occam\u2019s razor<\/a> theory) We initially went with five engines because another vehicle had experienced insufficient aerodynamic braking, requiring more engine thrust to compensate. After the maiden flight, I realized that risk wasn\u2019t as significant \u2013 three engines could bring it back. Adding two extra engines would only introduce additional failure points, which could end up costing us more than we gain. Every plan is a trade-off between benefit and cost.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Now that recovery has succeeded, what\u2019s next?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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We\u2019re aiming to reuse the recovered rocket as soon as possible.<\/p>\n

After this rocket returns, we\u2019ll disassemble it very carefully to see where damage occurred after this flight. If each component has a \u201chealth bar,\u201d our future work is to make sure every health bar is measurable, and repairable \u2013 and after repairs, we put it back on the launch pad.<\/p>\n

The main improvement areas for Zhuque-3 are increasing payload capacity, enhancing reliability, and shortening the reuse cycle. My personal aspiration is to get Zhuque-3 past the threshold of 10 launches per year.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** How soon do you plan to reuse it?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Given LandSpace\u2019s stainless steel production approach and engine manufacturing capacity, on average we can build a Zhuque-3 in dozens of days. I want to shorten the recovery-reuse cycle to less than the build time \u2013 the process of bringing the rocket back, doing adjustments, and sending it up again should take less time than building a new one. If it takes four or five months to refurbish, we might as well build a new one.<\/p>\n

In gaming terms, any spell that accelerates or rewinds time is a rare item. If I build 10 rockets and shorten the reuse cycle to two months, that\u2019s 10 times 6 \u2013 60 launches a year. If I cut the reuse time to one month, our launch capacity doubles again.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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**LatePost:** Compared to Falcon 9, where does Zhuque-3 stand?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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On a scale of 1 to 9, LandSpace is only at Level 6, which is laboratory validation. We\u2019ve just entered Level 7 \u2013 actual flight validation.<\/p>\n

It gets harder the higher you go. Level 8 would be marked by the ability to fly again. Level 9 \u2013 the highest \u2013 is scaled, routine launches with extremely high success rates.<\/p>\n

If you\u2019re familiar with *A Record of a Mortal\u2019s Journey to Immortality*, if Falcon 9 is a master, then Zhuque-3 is merely at its foundational stage. Once we can reuse it, we\u2019ll reach a higher level.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Were there any regrets from the design to the launch of Zhuque-3?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Not many in terms of product design. The maiden flight result was less than perfect, but I wouldn\u2019t call it a regret. The only regret is that the maiden flight came a bit later than hoped.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** What\u2019s the bottleneck for LandSpace\u2019s next phase of launch capability growth?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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With LandSpace\u2019s current launch pads and production capacity, we haven\u2019t hit the ceiling yet. LandSpace can build 20 rockets a year.<\/p>\n

Of course, this is also related to launch requirements and the current strictness of launch permit approvals. In the early stages of exploration, everyone tends to be more cautious. Even Musk has complained about the FAA \u2013 though now the FAA treats him fairly well.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Under what conditions would policy become more relaxed?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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Some things work on the principle of \u201cseeing is believing.\u201d<\/p>\n

So if you ask me what the bottleneck is, I\u2019d say: we haven\u2019t launched Zhuque-3 enough times yet. Our reliability data isn\u2019t comprehensive enough to put everyone completely at ease. We just need more practice \u2013 more launches, higher success rates, and things will naturally accelerate.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** What was the decision logic behind building Zhuque-3\u2019s body with stainless steel?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

To solve manufacturing challenges.<\/p>\n

I worked on the Long March 5. When the rocket body went from 3.35 meters to 5 meters in diameter, we encountered many difficulties. We wondered if there was a simpler solution \u2013 and stainless steel was the answer.<\/p>\n

First, the welding process is easier than with thin-walled aluminum alloys. Thin-walled aluminum pressure vessels are almost exclusively used in aerospace \u2013 few other industries use this technology, so the supply chain is limited. With stainless steel, the supply chain is abundant.<\/p>\n

Second, it\u2019s cheap \u2013 around tens of thousands of yuan per ton.<\/p>\n

Third, it has good heat resistance, eliminating the need for an additional thermal insulation layer. That\u2019s not just about cost and weight \u2013 with insulation, we\u2019d have to maintain it after every recovery, adding significant workload and demanding high repair standards.<\/p>\n

Fourth, it offers scalability \u2013 stainless steel can be made very thin.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

*<\/span>*LatePost:** SpaceX announced in 2018 that it would use stainless steel for its rockets. If stainless steel is so good, why didn\u2019t anyone use it before?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

LandSpace had considered it too. Back then, the aluminum alloy supply chain was too limited. Because of its narrow application range, aluminum alloy supply and production were almost entirely concentrated within the state aerospace system. We could have developed it ourselves, but that would have meant retreading the same path others had already walked. From a timeline perspective, that wasn\u2019t the optimal solution.<\/p>\n

Also, in those early days, the environment wasn\u2019t as favorable \u2013 you had to first prove \u201cI\u2019m capable, I can do this.\u201d Some of our choices were forced by circumstance.<\/p>\n

Plus, people thought stainless steel was too heavy \u2013 it has higher strength than aluminum alloys but also higher density, so it ends up heavier.<\/p>\n

In fact, based on material strength, you only need millimeter-thick rocket walls. But at that thickness, production becomes problematic \u2013 welding causes distortion. A 20-meter-long stainless steel cylinder might be round at the front during welding but end up oval at the back, because distortion accumulates. After too many welds, it no longer meets the tolerance requirements for docking with other segments.<\/p>\n

Welding itself is simple. Plenty of manufacturers in the Yangtze River Delta and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region that build storage tanks could do it. But they can\u2019t weld materials this thin, nor can they maintain the geometric tolerances at this scale.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** So how did you solve the welding problem?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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We focused on process development, using laser welding \u2013 the process with the lowest heat input \u2013 for the job.<\/p>\n

Thin-wall welding is only an issue at a 4.5-meter diameter. If you scale up to 9 or 10 meters \u2013 like Starship \u2013 the strength requirements increase, wall thickness goes above 2 millimeters, and welding becomes less challenging.<\/p>\n

LandSpace has a department called Tianma Laboratory (\u5929\u9a6c\u5b9e\u9a8c\u5ba4) \u2013 positioned similarly to Lockheed Martin\u2019s Skunk Works (one of the world\u2019s most famous secret advanced R&D facilities, which developed the F-22 Raptor). It\u2019s our elite team dedicated to solving stainless steel process challenges. We now use laser welding, essentially automated.<\/p>\n

But we didn\u2019t start with automation \u2013 we accumulated knowledge through repeated trials, observing how much 2-millimeter material would deform and where, then compensating in the robot\u2019s path planning. We also studied the material itself \u2013 not just deformation but original properties like temperature during welding. Through extensive time and data accumulation, we gradually worked down from 2 millimeters to thinner gauges, eventually achieving minimal error and good yield rates at very thin specifications, then froze the data and parameters.<\/p>\n

Every bit of thickness reduction directly translates into improved payload performance.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** So the welding improvements happened almost entirely in LandSpace\u2019s own labs, without suppliers?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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At present, the entire automated welding production for the rocket is developed by LandSpace itself. We don\u2019t reinvent the wheel where suppliers can do the job, but rocket welding isn\u2019t something the outsourced supply chain excels at.<\/p>\n

In the early stage, when we wanted to validate stainless steel strength, we found welding workers in the Yangtze River Delta and gave them 2-millimeter sheets to try, regardless of technique \u2013 manual argon arc welding, whatever. That only solved the \u201cwhether we can do it\u201d question. To truly compete on performance, we had to rely on ourselves.<\/p>\n

Also, with outsourced supply chains, quality control is harder to manage. If the pressure vessel fails, the consequences are disastrous. Our rocket body has strict requirements for shape retention and error control.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** When you approached steel mill workers in the Yangtze River Delta to weld a rocket, how did they react?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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We told them the diameter and volume \u2013 they said, okay, no problem.<\/p>\n

You have to trust the ingenuity of the private supply chain \u2013 and their cost control is remarkable. But when we said the thickness must not exceed a certain limit, with specific upper and lower bounds, plus geometric tolerance requirements for the tank surfaces, alignment of segments, hole parallelism, and roundness \u2013 they said, \u201cWe\u2019ve never seen requirements like this.\u201d<\/p>\n

Normally, their customers worry about them cutting corners and want thicker welds. Welding thin is not their specialty. Few other steel-using industries have such demands, and they have no reason to invest in such difficult processes just for rockets.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Is the stainless steel you use special, or ordinary?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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It\u2019s off-the-shelf material \u2013 tens of thousands of yuan per ton.<\/p>\n

Though we only produce small quantities, we treat the rocket as an industrial product, not a luxury item. We don\u2019t need to select a highly customized material.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** After switching to stainless steel, which other parts of the rocket needed modification or redesign?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Few major hardware changes. We reconsidered some things at the system level \u2013 since we were using stainless steel, we pushed it to its limits. For example, in the return strategy, with greater structural strength, we could choose more aggressive trajectories with higher dynamic pressure.<\/p>\n

If switching to stainless steel meant adding burdens elsewhere, that would indicate a fundamental flaw in the approach. We don\u2019t have \u201cunlimited ammunition\u201d \u2013 technical choices are made to solve problems, not to invent challenges to prove ourselves.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Not having \u201cunlimited ammunition\u201d \u2013 how does that change things for a commercial space company?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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Commercial space companies are very cautious when choosing rocket diameters, because different diameters require different infrastructure investments.<\/p>\n

The state aerospace system doesn\u2019t have to worry about this \u2013 they can pick the optimal data, whether 4.37 meters or 7.5 meters, and the launch site and ground support will accommodate it.<\/p>\n

Commercial space companies think about reducing unnecessary investment. We only choose diameters that the state programs have already used \u2013 4.2 meters, 3.35 meters \u2013 so we can use existing ground equipment and tooling interfaces. If not necessary, do not add entities.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** How did you complete the entire rocket in 28 months?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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There was preparatory work. The Tianque 12A engine used on Zhuque-3 was developed during the Zhuque-2 era. And the process validation for Zhuque-3 started with test articles as early as late 2022. These accumulations and trial-and-error helped us avoid repeating mistakes.<\/p>\n

In engineering, there are no shortcuts \u2013 only fewer detours.<\/p>\n

We never emphasized mandatory overtime. Instead, we clearly communicated project milestones across all departments. In a highly motivated organization, when everyone else is pushing toward deadlines, how can you tolerate falling behind? That\u2019s basically how those 28 months went.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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**LatePost:** How do you break down the challenge of launching something the size and weight of a skyscraper into space and bringing it back safely?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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Project decomposition is organized around major ground tests \u2013 modal tests, power system tests, and so on. Each test has corresponding requirements for each subsystem, specifying what state must be achieved by when. It\u2019s like a military operation \u2013 each unit must arrive early, never late.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** So each subsystem has autonomy, as long as it meets its targets on time?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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The top commander doesn\u2019t need to micromanage down to the platoon level. As the army group, I tell each division where and when to be \u2013 the rest is up to the division commander. This is a key feature of LandSpace\u2019s management \u2013 full delegation of authority.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Is that how it works inside China\u2019s state aerospace system?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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I don\u2019t think it\u2019s a matter of inside or outside the state system \u2013 it depends on the rocket program. If a program faces strong external competition and must be completed by a certain deadline, of course you delegate.<\/p>\n

The traditional approach does tend to be more granular \u2013 even specifying when certain documents should be completed. This places very high demands on the planning department. We know we\u2019re not yet capable of that level of control, so we delegate some autonomy.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** You said the ideal state is to let people be self-driven. That\u2019s a high bar, and rockets aren\u2019t exactly an area where success comes easily.<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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This kind of highly motivated organizational culture isn\u2019t achieved through lectures or indoctrination.<\/p>\n

First, through systems and institutions. LandSpace advocates \u201cpragmatic innovation and decisive execution,\u201d encourages trial and error, and doesn\u2019t make people worry that \u201cdoing more means making more mistakes.\u201d Rewards and consequences are clearly defined.<\/p>\n

Second, by providing real-world opportunities. In any organization, no matter the size, the truly effective force is the top 20\u201330%. These people are often driven not just by compensation but by a sense of achievement and self-actualization. LandSpace happens to provide a platform where they can keep getting real combat experience and building that sense of accomplishment.<\/p>\n

Think about it \u2013 what frustrates a highly skilled engineer the most? Spending all day on PowerPoint presentations and never having time to do what truly matters. We give them a stage.<\/p>\n

That sense of honor is built through battle after battle. I believe this logic applies to most knowledge-based work.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Rocket engineers need backgrounds in physics and materials \u2013 but now many AI companies are also recruiting these brightest minds. How do you attract top talent?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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Our definition of talent is somewhat different. LandSpace wants \u201cmoldable talent.\u201d In an industry as innovative as commercial space, I don\u2019t think what people have learned before counts for that much \u2013 it just means they can help us avoid a few detours. What we value more is growth potential and learning ability.<\/p>\n

The prerequisite is shared values. People who choose aerospace more or less have a sense of national mission. We offer compensation that removes the need for them to weigh personal sacrifice \u2013 not \u201cI chose aerospace, so I have to endure poverty.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** You mentioned that many in aerospace have deep passion and aspiration for this field. How did your own feelings for aerospace develop?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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I first attended a rocket maiden flight in 2016 \u2013 the Long March 5. At that moment, nothing else mattered \u2013 that was enough. The moment a rocket lifts off is an immense emotional shock for everyone who built it.<\/p>\n

Many people love this from childhood. For me, it was in college \u2013 when Shenzhou V launched in 2003 and Yang Liwei went to space \u2013 that I suddenly felt this industry was truly noble.<\/p>\n

I graduated and started working in 2009, just in time for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Whether it was learning patriotic songs or the early orientation training, there was a strong patriotic atmosphere.<\/p>\n

When you enter this industry, you have to give up a lot because of secrecy requirements \u2013 maybe not as extreme as working on weapons, but there are restrictions. Back then, one of the songs we learned was *The Motherland Will Not Forget*. It felt different from what we learned in middle school \u2013 it gave you a different feeling. When you\u2019re surrounded by that atmosphere, you can\u2019t help but be influenced and genuinely believe what you\u2019re doing is noble.<\/p>\n

Even now, I still feel that way. I can\u2019t explain it, but I feel like I carry a historical mission. From entering the\u5927\u9662 (compound) to leaving it and moving into commercial space \u2013 it\u2019s all driven by that original aspiration.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** What\u2019s the most important thing your experience at CASC gave you?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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Engineering discipline training. I was lucky \u2013 right after graduation, I joined the Long March 5 and the new-generation rocket program. New projects are great for professional growth.<\/p>\n

The commanders I worked with back then \u2013 I still admire them. It\u2019s like that scene in *The Decisive Engagement* where the commander says, \u201cLiu Yalou, take note \u2013 make the following deployments\u201d \u2013 you feel you\u2019re watching a top-level commander. I\u2019ve worked with people like that, and now I unconsciously emulate their approach. That\u2019s the 50-year legacy of China\u2019s aerospace program.<\/p>\n

Sometimes I see press portrayals of the state teams as competitors to be disparaged. I think that\u2019s a huge misunderstanding \u2013 it greatly underestimates China\u2019s decades of aerospace accumulation and its organizational capabilities.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** What aspects of the national teams do you think are underestimated?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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First, they always have to control the floor \u2013 the minimum acceptable outcome. That\u2019s a different logic from commercial space, which takes risks in pursuit of higher ceilings. It\u2019s like why you go to a top-tier hospital instead of a street clinic \u2013 the clinic might advertise \u201cwe once cured a terminal case,\u201d pursuing the best possible outcome, while you go to a major hospital because its baseline is reliable. The same logic applies to state aerospace decision-making.<\/p>\n

Second, all martial arts come from Shaolin Temple (\u5929\u4e0b\u6b66\u529f\u51fa\u5c11\u6797). China\u2019s commercial space industry\u2019s true \u201cWhampoa Military Academy\u201d is the state system \u2013 most of our early employees came from there. If you consider the state system as part of China\u2019s commercial space landscape, it\u2019s the flagship, bearing the burden of trial and error. We\u2019re taking fewer detours today because they\u2019ve already blazed the trail.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Looking at SpaceX\u2019s history, many of their early efforts were things NASA had already done \u2013 just done more cheaply. But eventually there\u2019s a gear shift \u2013 they also have to take on the role of leader.<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

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Yes, exactly. On a broader scale, SpaceX is the big brother of global commercial space now.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Over the past two decades, every aspect of aerospace technology has changed \u2013 stainless steel materials, engine technology. If you take a systematic view, what are the major shifts you see in the field?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

In 2009, China\u2019s aerospace was always talking about catching up with the world. Today, if not for SpaceX, China would be number one \u2013 the state program has surpassed NASA. The United Launch Alliance (the Lockheed Martin-Boeing joint venture serving the U.S. military and NASA), once considered unassailable, has transformed dramatically. Who would have thought Boeing\u2019s \u201cspace black shop\u201d would also face setbacks?<\/p>\n

Second, the development of heavy-lift rockets has exceeded expectations. Back then, people felt building a heavy-lift rocket was a lifelong endeavor. For Long March 5, if you count from feasibility studies, it started in 1986, engine development in 1996, project approval in 2006, and launch in 2016 \u2013 forty years in total. When I first joined the Long March 5 program, senior colleagues told me, \u201cYou\u2019re lucky \u2013 you get to work on a new rocket,\u201d meaning I\u2019d have a chance to go into battle, like a soldier finally getting to fight a major war.<\/p>\n

In retrospect, the changes from 2016 to 2018 were dramatic. SpaceX went from Falcon 9 to Falcon Heavy in just over two years. For me, that was an even bigger shock than watching Falcon 9 land. And Starship even more so.<\/p>\n

Third, there are now over 80 rockets awaiting launch in China \u2013 named and unnamed. In the past, the Long March series had just over a dozen. For those of us in the industry, it feels like the spring of commercial space has arrived.<\/p>\n

When I first started working on rockets, I thought maybe after Long March 5, if I was lucky, I\u2019d get to work on heavy-lift rockets. Now the landscape has changed entirely \u2013 the entire global aerospace industry has a new vitality.<\/p>\n

When Musk first talked about launching 42,000 satellites, we all thought that number was inflated. That became a lesson for me \u2013 never make judgments too quickly.<\/p>\n

We\u2019ve always had respect for SpaceX \u2013 not for the grand narratives, but for the fact that after three Falcon 1 failures, they dared to organize a fourth launch \u2013 \u201cThey can do that? They dare to do that?\u201d After that, it seemed like everyone had a psychological anchor: I can fail three times.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Beyond Zhuque-3, what are LandSpace\u2019s next technology priorities?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

The core priority for Zhuque-3 going forward is engine upgrades to improve payload. The Tianque 12B engine should be delivered around the end of this year or early next year. Meanwhile, LandSpace is also developing the Lanyan full-flow engine, which has undergone many test firings, but it will take considerably longer to integrate into the full rocket.<\/p>\n

Larger-scale rockets are still in the technology demonstration phase. Project timing will depend on market demand and also on how Zhuque-3 operations perform. At this stage, our priority is to increase Zhuque-3\u2019s launch frequency to 30\u201350 times a year.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** That number doesn\u2019t sound very aggressive.<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

In 2023 and 2024, the total launch volume for all of China was about 160 tons per year. What does that mean for Zhuque-3? In reusable mode, that\u2019s just over a dozen launches.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Historically, even the U.S. state teams couldn\u2019t afford failures. Now people think commercial space has more room for trial and error. But rockets are still expensive \u2013 how does LandSpace balance experimentation with safety and success?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

It\u2019s not that contradictory. First, we absolutely do not tolerate management or process risks. Second, we have systems in place to ensure personnel safety \u2013 unmanned operations, automation, remote control.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** But as a commercial company, you still have to control costs.<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Our core reason for cost control is survival \u2013 not improving gross margin by a few percentage points on a financial statement. We don\u2019t calculate how much margin increases if we cut costs from 50 million to 30 million. Rather, if we save that 20 million, we can run more tests and have more opportunities to iterate. There are red lines and bottom lines we cannot cross in design decisions \u2013 beyond that, we cut unnecessary or non-essential expenses.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Still sounds difficult. What\u2019s the fundamental advantage of the commercial approach?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Greater supply chain flexibility.<\/p>\n

The state system has strict quality control requirements for its suppliers \u2013 they use supplier certainty to counter the uncertainty of new products.<\/p>\n

The state team\u2019s supply chain is constrained not only by economic indicators but also by various regulatory requirements. It\u2019s not just a straightforward transaction \u2013 if something goes wrong, accountability must be traced back to individuals. This model raises costs and extends timelines, but it keeps the floor under control.<\/p>\n

Using market-based supply chains gives us access to cheaper components \u2013 and \u201ccheaper\u201d doesn\u2019t mean squeezing supplier margins. It\u2019s because China is a major industrial power with many highly competitive sectors, good efficiency, and high yield rates. In the trade-off between cost and reliability, we can be bolder. But higher flexibility is both an advantage and a disadvantage \u2013 controlling the floor can also be more difficult.<\/p>\n

This places greater demands on our quality control. We can\u2019t just issue a statement of work to a supplier and accept their word that \u201cit\u2019s done.\u201d We need our own ways to verify and test whether suppliers actually meet the standards, rather than building reliability on their commercial credibility. In the past, rocket designers signed off on documents and their job was done. Now we\u2019re also responsible for outcomes. Comparing the two models, commercial space places higher demands on technical personnel.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** In terms of organization, personnel, and collaboration, how different is it from your time in the state system?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

It looks similar on the surface, but fundamentally quite different.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, it\u2019s about quality control. In the state system, the organizational philosophy is to assign dedicated personnel to every task, break systems down into finer pieces, control the floor, and ensure stability even with staff turnover. The cost is increased system complexity.<\/p>\n

From an engineer\u2019s perspective, almost all quality issues arise at handoff points \u2013 just like in warfare, breakthroughs happen at the seams between two units. If a unit fights alone, it knows its responsibility and won\u2019t let the enemy through. The traditional system relies on more robust procedures to ensure handoffs go smoothly.<\/p>\n

The result: the state aerospace system has dozens of times more people than us. LandSpace, with 1,000\u20132,000 employees, is considered large in commercial space \u2013 but they have tens of thousands, yet their efficiency isn\u2019t 10 times greater, because a significant portion of their workforce is dedicated to managing the risks of organizational complexity. They\u2019ve found their balance.<\/p>\n

Commercial space inherits this system but reduces complexity. We keep the critical architecture and the principle of each unit guarding its own territory, but we don\u2019t divide personnel too finely \u2013 we maintain higher integration. A task that might require five or six handoff stages could be handled by a single team that bridges them all, potentially reducing handoff risks. Increasing individual responsibility may increase risk, but it can also reduce it. It\u2019s all about balance at different stages of organizational development.<\/p>\n

Our COO said late last year that LandSpace will remain a startup for a long time \u2013 solving quality issues and reducing management complexity remain key tasks.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** As commercial space becomes more visible to the public in recent years, have the types of talent you attract changed significantly?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Commercial space companies tend to do more experienced hiring. The density of fresh graduates with top talent isn\u2019t as high as in the state system.<\/p>\n

New graduates benefit from the structured training in the state aerospace system. We do have development programs, but not as comprehensive as \u201cShaolin Temple\u201d \u2013 we tend to throw people into the battlefield.<\/p>\n

For experienced hires, we\u2019ve also brought in people from other industries, like automotive. Traditional engineers aren\u2019t as cost-sensitive \u2013 they assume things should cost what they cost. But people from automotive tell us, \u201cIn our industry, this doesn\u2019t cost nearly that much.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Can you give an example?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

Take ambient temperature sensors for rockets \u2013 they cost tens to hundreds of yuan each. People from automotive say, \u201cWe use these for a few yuan \u2013 how can you be charging so much?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** Doesn\u2019t aerospace require specific certification standards for all components, which drives up cost?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

We certify based on results. For components where we can control the outcome, the validation process is faster. I even think this is likely the trend for commercial space. Some things may be called \u201cautomotive-grade\u201d on the ground \u2013 but if they\u2019ve flown to space and proven themselves, I\u2019d say calling them \u201cspace-grade\u201d isn\u2019t a stretch.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

**LatePost:** When did you start believing that a private company building a reusable rocket was definitely achievable?<\/em><\/p>\n

**Dong Kai:** <\/p>\n

\n

We believed China\u2019s reusable rockets would definitely succeed.<\/p>\n

From a technical logic standpoint, LandSpace had accumulated power system experience with Zhuque-2. The Zhuque-3 maiden flight was also successful. The remaining critical technology was the 3.3-kilometer recovery phase. Given the technical conditions at the time, we couldn\u2019t guarantee 100% success, but we couldn\u2019t see any rigid technical obstacles in any part of the process.<\/p>\n

But really, you don\u2019t need to overthink the final outcome. If we\u2019re talking about operational costs and results, we trust our founder Zhang Changwu\u2019s judgment. If he\u2019s bold enough to take the bet, we don\u2019t need to overcomplicate things \u2013 we just focus on the engineering, make the most of limited resources, and maximize our chances.<\/p>\n

However hard it gets, it can\u2019t be harder than Musk\u2019s early days \u2013 even Armstrong said it wouldn\u2019t work. That\u2019s the significance of pioneers \u2013 they prove something can be done. Since he can, so can we.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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Source link <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

August 19 morning marks a historic peak for China\u2019s commercial space industry. China\u2019s private rocket company\u2019s Zhuque-3 (ZQ-3), often dubbed the \u201cChina\u2019s Falcon 9,\u201d successfully recovered its first stage booster on its second attempt. It might not be as explosive as a first-try success, and it missed out on the glory of being China\u2019s very […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":16,"featured_media":23369,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[143],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-23368","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-ai"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23368","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/16"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23368"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23368\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23369"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23368"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23368"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scannn.com\/lv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23368"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}